The state-based system of global governance has struggled for more than a generation to adjust to the expanding reach and growing influence of transnational corporations. The United Nations (UN) first attempted to establish binding international rules to govern the activities of transnationals in the 1970s.
1 That endeavor was initiated by developing countries as part of a broader regulatory program with redistributive aims known as the New International Economic Order. 2 Human rights did not feature in this initiative. The Soviet bloc supported it while most industrialized countries were opposed.
Negotiations ground to a halt after more than a decade, though they were not formally abandoned until 1992. 4 Focused on norm diffusion and the dissemination of practical know-how and tools, the GC has become the world's largest corporate social responsibility initiative, with some 3,000 participating companies and forty national networks. It is unique among such initiatives for its extensive involvement of developing country companies.
Fueled by escalating reports of corporate human rights abuses, especially in the extractive sector and the footwear and apparel industries, the UN Sub-Commission on the Promotion and Protection of Human Rights ("Sub-Commission"), a subsidiary body of the then Commission on Human Rights, comprised of twenty-six more or less independent experts, established a working group on business and human rights in 1998. 5 It was tasked to "make recommendations and proposals relating to the methods of work and activities of transnational corporations in order to…promote the enjoyment of economic, social and cultural rights and the right to development, as well as of civil and political rights." 6 In 2003, the working group produced the "Draft Norms on the
Responsibilities of Transnational Corporations and Other Business Enterprises with
Regard to Human Rights" 7 ("draft Norms").
Written in treaty-like language, the text comprises twenty-three articles setting out human rights standards for companies in areas ranging from international humanitarian law, through civil, political, economic, social, and cultural rights, to consumer protection and environmental practices. Acknowledging that states are the primary duty bearers in relation to human rights, it stipulates that transnational firms and other business enterprises, within their "spheres of activity and influence," have corresponding legal duties. 8 It also requires that corporate compliance be monitored by national and international agencies, and victims provided with effective remedies. The main international human rights NGOs (non-governmental organizations)
endorsed the draft Norms, and began to refer to them as the "UN Norms," while the business community, represented by the International Chamber of Commerce (ICC) and the International Organization of Employers (IOE), was firmly opposed. 12 For its part, the Commission granted that the document contained "useful elements and ideas," but added that it had not requested it and that, as a draft proposal, it had no legal standing.
The Sub-Commission was also instructed not to engage in any monitoring of corporate activities.
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Although the Commission was not prepared to adopt the proposal, a broad spectrum of states, including several major industrialized countries, felt that the issue of business and human rights did require serious attention and sought ways to keep it on the agenda. Thus, the Commission asked the Secretariat to explore options and report back.
14 With consensus still elusive a year later, the Commission then requested the UN Secretary-General to appoint a Special Representative (SRSG), initially for a two-year term, with a wide-ranging mandate to "identify and clarify" international standards and policies in relation to business and human rights, elaborate on key concepts including "corporate complicity" and "spheres of influence," and submit "views and recommendations" for consideration by the Commission. 15 On 25 July 2005, the UN Economic and Social Council approved the Commission's request, and three days later then Secretary-General Kofi Annan appointed me to the post of SRSG. 16 This article provides an overview of the SRSG mandate's work to date, and lays out the broad direction in which it is moving. In doing so, it indicates why I concluded that I could not "endorse" or "build upon" the draft Norms as the basis for my mandate,
as some participants in the debate had urged me to do. 17 The article draws on two sets of reports I have submitted to the Commission and its successor body, the Human Rights Council (HRC); nearly two dozen research papers produced by or for the mandate; the results of three regional multi-stakeholder consultations (Johannesburg, Bangkok, and Bogotá), four international workshops of legal experts, and two multi-stakeholder consultations focused on individual sectors (extractives and financial services); site visits to the international operations of companies on three continents; as well as pro bono research conducted for the mandate by several law firms. 18 The article is divided into three parts: a brief discussion of the central conceptual flaws of the draft Norms; some problematic factual claims made by Norms' advocates coupled with a mapping of standards, legal and otherwise, that currently govern the activities of business in relation to human rights; and a concluding section on the mandate's future directions.
I. CONCEPTUAL CHALLENGES
It would be surprising if all major actors in the "Norms" debate, quite apart from the substantive merits of their arguments, did not also behave strategically, in keeping with their perceived interests. Business typically dislikes binding regulations until it sees their necessity or inevitability. Governments often support the preferences of corporations domiciled in their countries and/or compete for foreign investment. And the imprimatur of "UN Norms" would have provided NGOs with a powerful campaign tool:
declaring certain corporate acts to be "illegal" has far greater social purchase, even in the absence of viable enforcement mechanisms, than merely claiming corporate "wrongdoing."
The SRSG mandate was not bound by these prior positions, however, nor was it intended simply to search for the lowest common denominator among them. Indeed, because the draft Norms were the only comprehensive business and human rights proposal on the table, I believed they merited careful assessment to see if they could serve as a sound basis for moving forward. But I found instead that they embodied sources of conceptual as well as factual confusion, with potentially deleterious consequences for the realization of rights. I summarize the key conceptual issues in the present section; they were addressed in the report I presented to the Commission in February 2006. 19 The factual issues are discussed in the next section.
The Universe
To minimize charges of bias against globalization and the transnational corporations that are its most visible embodiment, the Norms project came to include "other business enterprises," not only transnationals, within its remit. But it ended up exempting nationally operating businesses if they had no connections to transnational corporations, the impact of their activities was purely local, and their activities involved no violations of the right to the security of the person -though neither the text nor the commentary indicated how the last of these exemptions would be determined ex ante.
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According to the most recent figures, 77,000 transnational firms span the global economy today, with some 770,000 subsidiaries and millions of suppliers -Wal-Mart alone is reported to have more than 60,000 suppliers. 21 Transnationals operate in more countries than ever before, and increasingly in socio-political contexts that pose entirely novel human rights challenges for them. 22 In addition, for many companies going global has meant adopting network-based operating models involving multiple corporate entities, spread across and within countries. Networks, by their very nature, involve divesting a certain amount of direct control over significant operations, substituting negotiated relationships for hierarchical structures. This organizational form has enhanced the economic efficiency of firms. But it also has increased the challenges companies face in managing their global value chains -the full range of activities required to bring a product or service from its conception to end use. 23 As the number of participating units in value chains increases so, too, does the potential vulnerability any particular link in the chain poses to the global enterprise as a whole. 24 At the same time, these distributed networks also have increased the available entry points through which civil society actors can seek to leverage a company's brand and resources in the hope of improving not only the firm's performance, but also the setting in which it operates.
Transnational corporate networks pose a regulatory challenge to the international legal system. To begin with, in legal terms purchasing goods and services from unrelated suppliers generally is considered an arms-length market exchange, not an intra-firm transaction. Among related parties, a parent company and its subsidiaries are distinct legal entities, and even large-scale projects may be incorporated separately. Any one of them may be engaged in joint ventures with other firms or governments. Due to the doctrine of limited liability, a parent company generally is not legally liable for wrongs committed by a subsidiary even where it is the sole shareholder, unless the subsidiary is under such close operational control by the parent that it can be seen as its mere agent.
Each legally distinct entity is subject to the laws of the countries in which it operates, but the transnational corporate group or network as a whole is not governed directly by international law. It is this foundational fact that the move to establish global legal standards for transnational corporations seeks to alter. And it has begun to change.
Rights and Duties
If international human rights obligations are to be attributed to transnational
corporations, on what basis shall this be done? It seems clear that long-standing doctrinal arguments over whether such firms could be "subjects" of international law are yielding to new realities on the ground. For example, firms have acquired significant rights under various types of bilateral investment treaties and host government agreements, they set international standards in several sectors, and certain corporate acts are directly prohibited in a number of civil liability conventions dealing with environmental pollution. 25 Thus, at minimum transnational corporations have become "participants" in the international legal system, as Rosalyn Higgins, President of the International Court of Justice, puts it, with the capacity to bear some rights and duties under international law. 26 The case made for the draft Norms went like this. The UDHR, in its preamble, proclaims that "every individual and every organ of society…shall strive by teaching and education to promote respect for these rights and freedoms and by progressive measures, national and international, to secure their universal and effective recognition and observance." 27 Transnational corporations have greater power than some states to affect the realization of rights, the argument continued, and "with power should come responsibility." 28 Therefore, these corporations must bear responsibility for the rights they may impact. And because some states are unable or unwilling to make them do so under domestic law, there must be direct and uniform corporate responsibilities under international law.
The draft Norms enumerated rights that appeared to be particularly relevant to business, including non-discrimination, the security of the person, labor standards, and indigenous peoples' rights. But the list included rights that states have not recognized or are still debating at the global level, including consumer protection, the "precautionary principle" for environmental management, and the principle of "free, prior and informed consent" of indigenous peoples and communities. At the same time, the draft allowed that not all recognized rights pertain to business but provided no principled basis for making that determination. In response to the criticism that the list was overly inclusive, some
Norms' advocates have suggested a shorter set of "core" rights said to enjoy the most widespread support, and which business could easily grasp. 29 But that move in turn is subject to the riposte that the very concept of core rights is "a very significant departure from the insistence within the international human rights regime on the equal importance of all human rights." 30 The issue remains unresolved and has led some observers to conclude than any detailed ex ante specification of rights for which companies might bear some responsibility is an inherently fruitless exercise -that in principle all rights could apply, but in any particular instance some will not.
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A far more serious problem concerns the draft Norms' proposed formula for attributing human rights duties to corporations. After recognizing that states are the primary duty bearers, the General Obligations article adds: "Within their respective spheres of activity and influence, transnational corporations and other business enterprises have the obligation to promote, secure the fulfillment of, respect, ensure respect of and protect" nationally and internationally recognized human rights. 32 That is to say, within corporations' "spheres of influence" they would have exactly the same range of duties as states -from respecting to fulfilling rights -the only difference being that states' duties would be primary and corporations' duties secondary. But the draft Norms defined none of these terms. The concept of corporate spheres of influence, though useful as an analytical tool, seems to have no legal pedigree. 33 Therefore, the boundaries within which corporations' secondary duties would take effect remain unknown. Nor was the distinction between primary and secondary duties elaborated.
With scope and threshold conditions left unspecified, it seems highly likely that the attribution of corporate duties in practice would come to hinge on the respective capacities of states and corporations in particular situations -so that where states were unable or unwilling to do their job, the pressure would be on companies to step in. This may be desirable in special circumstances, but as a general proposition it is deeply troubling on several grounds.
Philip Alston, former Chair of the United Nations Committee on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights, identifies both the problem and its resulting dilemma:
If the only difference is that governments have a comprehensive set of obligations, while those of corporations are limited to their 'spheres of influence'…how are the latter [obligations] to be delineated? Does Shell's sphere of influence in the Niger Delta not cover everything ranging from the right to health, through the right to free speech, to the rights to physical integrity and due process? 34 Alston raises concerns that this formula could undermine corporate autonomy, risktaking, and entrepreneurship, asking: "what are the consequences of saddling
[corporations] with all of the constraints, restrictions, and even positive obligations which apply to governments?" 35 Indeed, because corporations are not democratic public interest institutions they should be permitted to have such roles only in exceptional circumstances -for example, where they perform state functions.
The formula's possible impact on the roles and responsibilities of governments is equally troubling. Within the constraints of "progressive realization," the international human rights regime recognizes the legitimate need of governments to exercise discretion for making trade-offs and balancing decisions, and especially for determining how best to "secure the fulfillment" of, precisely the economic, social, and cultural rights on which corporations may have greatest influence. Imposing the full range of duties on transnational corporations directly under international law by definition reduces the discretionary space of individual governments within the scope of those duties. 36 The draft Norms' attempt to square the circle by requiring companies also to follow national laws and policy priorities -and even "the most protective standards" wherever those may be found -is no solution. 37 It merely adds layers of conflicting prescriptions for firms to follow. In addition, where governance is weak to begin with, shifting obligations onto corporations to protect and even fulfill the broad spectrum of human rights may further undermine domestic political incentives to make governments more responsive and responsible to their own citizenry, which surely is the most effective way to realize rights.
Finally, attributing the same range of duties to corporations that currently apply to states, differentiated only in degree within undefined corporate "spheres of influence,"
would generate endless strategic gaming and legal wrangling on the part of governments and companies alike. As illustrated by a recent Brazilian case where a corporation and a government authority are contesting who reneged on their legal obligations to provide support to communities of indigenous peoples, the rights of vulnerable groups and individuals are not well served in such circumstances. 38 In sum, while it may be useful for some purposes to think of corporations as "organs of society," they are specialized organs, performing specialized functions. The range of their duties should reflect that fact. Already in a 1949 opinion, the International
Court of Justice explained that recognizing an international personality "is certainly not the same thing as saying that…its rights and duties are the same as those of a state." 39 Imposing on corporations the same range of duties as states for all rights they may impact conflates the two spheres and renders effective rulemaking itself highly problematic.
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II. MAPPING STANDARDS
Another problematic feature of the debate that preceded the creation of the SRSG mandate and carried over into it was the sharply divergent views about the actual state of international law regarding business and human rights. The draft Norms were described as "a restatement of international legal principles applicable to companies." 41 As we have just seen, they would have imposed direct obligations on corporations under international law and were said to be "non-voluntary" in character. According to one authoritative source, restatements "reflect the law as it presently stands or might plausibly be stated by a court." 42 The idea that the Norms project amounted to no more than a "restatement" of legal principles was contested by business and also questioned by academic observers. 43 Apparently the Commission on Human Rights was not persuaded either, because my first task under the mandate was "to identify and clarify standards of corporate responsibility and accountability for transnational corporations and other business enterprises with regard to human rights" -essentially, to "restate" existing standards and indicate emerging trends.
Therefore, within the limits of our time and resource constraints, the SRSG's team set out to map international standards and practices regarding business and human rights.
In March 2007, I presented the results to the Human Rights Council in a report with four addenda of supporting materials. 44 The mapping was organized into five clusters laid out along a continuum, starting with the most deeply rooted international legal obligations and ending with voluntary business standards: the state duty to protect against corporate abuses; corporate responsibility and accountability for international crimes; corporate responsibility for other human rights violations under international law; soft law mechanisms; and self-regulation.
The State Duty to Protect
All sides agree that the state is the primary duty bearer in relation to human rights.
But its duty to protect against third party abuses of rights, including by business entities, The Committees express concern about state failure to protect against business abuse most frequently in relation to the right to non-discrimination, indigenous peoples' rights, and labor and health-related rights. But they indicate that the duty to protect applies to all substantive rights recognized by the treaties that private parties are capable of abusing. The Committees tend not to specify the precise content of required state action, but generally recommend regulation through legislation and adjudication through judicial remedies, including compensation where appropriate.
The Committees have not expressly interpreted the treaties as requiring states to exercise extraterritorial jurisdiction over abuses committed abroad by corporations domiciled in their territory. 49 But nor do they seem to regard the treaties as prohibiting such action, and in some situations they have encouraged it. For example, the Committee on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights has suggested that states parties take steps to "prevent their own citizens and companies" from violating rights in other countries.
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And the Committee on the Elimination of Racial Discrimination recently noted "with concern" reports of adverse impacts on the rights of indigenous peoples in other countries from the activities of corporations registered in a state party. The Committee encouraged that state to "take appropriate legislative or administrative measures" to prevent such acts, recommended that the state explore ways to hold such corporations "accountable,"
and asked that the state provide information on measures taken its next periodic report. Given this expanding jurisdictional web, simple laws of probability alone suggest that corporations will be subject to increased liability risks for international crimes in the future. They may face either criminal or civil liability depending on whether international standards are incorporated into a state's criminal code or as a civil cause of action. 60 Further, companies cannot be certain where claims will be brought against them or what precise standards they may be held to. No two national jurisdictions have identical evidentiary and other procedural rules, and there is significant national variation in modes of establishing a corporate "mind and will," 61 and in cases involving corporate groups. 62 Few companies may ever directly commit acts that amount to international crimes. But there is greater risk of their facing allegations of "complicity" in such crimes.
With nuanced differences, most national legal systems recognize complicity as a concept.
The ad hoc international tribunals have developed a fairly clear standard for individual liability in such cases: knowingly providing practical assistance, encouragement or moral support that has a substantial effect on the commission of the crime. 63 Where national courts adopt this standard it is likely that its application to corporations would closely track its application to individuals, although the element of "moral support" may pose specific challenges. 64 A company trying in good faith to avoid involvement in human rights abuses might have difficulty knowing what counts as moral support for legal purposes. Mere presence in a country and paying taxes are unlikely to create liability. But deriving indirect economic benefit from the wrongful conduct of others may do so, depending on such facts as the closeness of the company's association with those actors.
However, even where a corporation did not intend for a crime to occur it may be held liable if it knew, or should have known, that it was providing assistance that had a substantial effect on the commission of the crime.
As this scenario of expanding corporate liability unfolds, the uncertainty created by national variations in how international standards are applied in practice may become increasingly problematic for all parties and generate a demand for greater harmonization.
Corporate Responsibility for Other Human Rights Violations under International Law
The traditional view of international human rights instruments is that they impose only "indirect" responsibilities on corporations -provided under domestic law in accordance with states' international obligations. In contrast, it was claimed that the draft Norms, which imposed direct obligations on corporations under international law, "derive legal authority from their sources in treaties and customary international law." 65 Committee's most recent General Comment concludes that the treaty obligations "do not…have direct horizontal effect as a matter of international law" -that is, they take effect as between nonstate actors only under domestic law. 68 Provisions under the ILO's conventions operate in much the same manner, even though corporations are intended as one of their main addressees.
Nothing prevents states from imposing international legal responsibilities for human rights directly on corporations. But the evidence we reviewed does not indicate that they have already done so to any appreciable extent. Nonetheless, the increased attention the UN and other international human rights bodies are devoting to the need to prevent corporate abuse acknowledges that businesses are capable of both breaching human rights and contributing to their protection. 69 Moreover, even in the absence of direct international legal obligations companies still may find themselves tried in the court of public opinion by the standards of these instruments. No doubt this fact helps explain the next two developments.
Soft Law
To address corporate responsibility and accountability for human rights, governments utilize a variety of other international mechanisms that have the force of "soft law," some of which may also include legislative or regulatory dimensions.
The first is the traditional soft law standard-setting role of intergovernmental organizations. 70 To illustrate, the OECD Guidelines recommend that firms "respect the Committee -to consult their memberships and recommend a formula to reduce this gap.
In December 2006 they submitted a policy paper to the mandate that goes beyond the current OECD Guidelines: "All companies have the same responsibility in weak governance zones as they do elsewhere. They are expected to obey the law, even if it is not enforced, and to respect the principles of relevant international instruments where national law is absent." 73 If governments include this business-supported formula in the soon-to-be revised Guidelines, it will mark an advance in the prior soft law standard. In the meantime it serves as prudential advice to companies. Corporation (IFC) has adopted performance standards that companies are required to meet in return for IFC investment funds, which include several human rights elements. 75 Client compliance is subject to review by an Ombudsman. The IFC standards also have spillover effects, as they are followed by banks adhering to the Equator Principles, which are responsible for some 80 percent of global commercial project lending. These studies indicate that voluntary initiatives have expanded rapidly in recent years. The FG500 survey suggests that there is substantial policy diffusion going on:
almost all respondents report having some human rights policies or management practices in place, yet fewer than half say they have experienced "a significant human rights issue" themselves. Uptake is concentrated among European, North American and, to a lesser extent, Japanese firms. Newer entrants from elsewhere lag behind, though it is unclear whether this reflects a difference in approach or is merely a matter of timing. 84 Leading firms, collective initiatives, and SRIs recognize a broad array of human rights. The self-reporting in the FG500 survey produced more impressive results than those we documented in the broader "business recognition study," but the patterns were similar. Labor rights are the most widely recognized across all regions and sectors, topped by nondiscrimination. Recognition of other rights broadly tracks industry sectors.
The extractive industry, for example, ranks community rights and the security of the person more highly than other sectors, while financial services stress privacy rights. In formulating their human rights policies, companies typically draw on international instruments or initiatives. But the language of the standards is rarely identical, and in some instances it is so elastic that the standards lose meaning, making it difficult for the company itself, let alone the public, to assess performance against commitments. There are also variations in the recognition of rights that seem unrelated to expected sectoral differences, appearing instead to reflect the political culture of companies' home countries: for example, European-based firms tend to adopt a more comprehensive rights agenda than others, including social and economic rights, with US firms acknowledging only a narrower spectrum of rights and rights holders.
The Achilles heel of self-regulatory arrangements to date is their underdeveloped accountability mechanisms. Company initiatives increasingly include rudimentary forms of internal and external reporting, as well as some form of supply chain monitoring. But no universally -or even widely -accepted standards yet exist for these practices. The
International Organization for Standardization is developing a social responsibility "guidance standard," but it is not focused specifically on corporations or human rights. 85 The Global Reporting Initiative provides standardized protocols to improve the quality and comparability of company social and environmental reporting, including human rights indicators, but fewer than 200 firms report "in accordance with" its guidelines, another 700 partially, while others claim to use them informally. 86 Experience to date has shown that supply chain monitoring by itself produces only limited behavioral changes at the factory level. 87 Beyond certain multi-stakeholder systems, like the Fair Labor Association, or third party certified processes, such as Social Accountability 8000, social audits currently enjoy only limited credibility among external stakeholders. 88 Relatively few companies that engage in large footprint projects seem ever to have conducted a fully-fledged human rights impact assessment, although a larger number includes selected human rights criteria in broader social/environmental assessments. 89 And only a few such projects provide for community complaints procedures or remedies.
The leading SRI indices tend to be more comprehensive than company or industry-based policies, and they promote human rights impact assessments more strongly. 90 Moreover, the idea of "responsible investment" has gained considerable ground in the past few years, with greater involvement of mainstream institutions. 91 The substantial expansion of voluntary initiatives has not yet engaged many stateowned enterprises from emerging market economies, which are becoming important players on the global stage. And laggards of all provenances continue to find ways of avoiding scrutiny. But the biggest challenge may be bringing such efforts to a scale where they truly can move markets. For that to occur, it appears that states will need to structure business incentives and disincentives more proactively, while accountability practices must become more deeply embedded within market mechanisms themselves.
Summing Up
I presented this mapping to the Human Rights Council in March 2007. Eighteen delegations spoke in the ensuing interactive dialogue. 92 Some "welcomed" or noted it "with interest," signifying a positive reception in UN parlance, while none indicated disagreement with its findings. 93 International business responded favorably. 94 Five leading NGOs, in a joint statement to the Council, expressed appreciation for my "attention and commitment" to the issue, while stressing the limits of voluntarism coupled with the need to give greater voice to victims. 95 Subsequently, the G8 Summit in Heiligendamm indicated its support for the mandate. 96 Preferences on how to move ahead continue to vary. But the mapping exercise succeeded in its objective of providing a common foundation for future deliberations by constructing a brief "restatement" of current international standards and practices regarding business and human rights.
The extensive research and consultations that went into the conceptual and factual "ground clearing" phase of the mandate left little time for a strategic assessment of the major legal and policy measures that states and other social actors could take to close protection gaps, let alone to recommend which options might work best. Therefore, in my
March 2007 presentation I asked the Council to extend the mandate by a year -giving it the normal three year duration of mandates. 97 It did so at its June 2007 session.
III. FUTURE DIRECTIONS
Increasing the effectiveness of the international human rights regime to deal with the challenges posed by globalization is a long-term project. The mapping reported in the previous section indicates that this is a fluid area, but one in which significant protection gaps remain. The findings of the mandate to date also suggest a number of guiding principles for how to build on the existing momentum and move towards closing the gaps. Here, I briefly enumerate three that bear most specifically on the role of international law.
First, any "grand strategy" needs to strengthen and build out from the existing capacity of states and the states system to regulate and adjudicate harmful actions by corporations, not undermine it. Currently, at the domestic level some governments may be unable to take effective action on their own, whether or not the will to do so is present.
And in the international arena states may compete for access to markets and investments, argues, would unduly constrict -he actually uses the term "incarcerate" 103 -the social logics and processes other than law that drive the evolving public recognition of rights.
The implication of Sen' insight for the business and human rights agenda is that any successful regime needs to motivate, activate, and benefit from all of the moral, social, and economic rationales that can affect the behavior of corporations. This requires providing incentives as well as punishments, identifying opportunities as well as risks, and building social movements and political coalitions that involve representation from all relevant sectors of society, including business -much as has been occurring in the environmental field. The human rights community has long urged a move "beyond voluntarism" in the area of business and human rights. 104 Sen's advice suggests that this be accompanied by willingness on their part also to look "beyond compliance."
In sum, international law has an important role to play in constructing a better functioning global regime to govern business and human rights. The effectiveness of its contributions will be maximized if it is embedded within, and deployed in support of, an overall strategy of increasing governance capacity in the face of enormously complex and ever-changing forces of globalization. . These reports were compiled with the assistance of a Harvard-based research team, pro bono contributions from law firms, and international workshops of legal experts. 45 States also have duties to respect, promote and fulfill rights, but the most business-relevant is the duty to protect because it is directed at third party abuse. Beyond the national territory, the scope of the duty will vary depending on the state's degree of control. 
